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The United States Army in Transition  
BY DAVID H. POPPER

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# The United States Army in Transition

BY DAVID H. POPPER

*This is the first in a series of reports on the military defenses of the United States. Subsequent issues will deal with outlying American bases and with the United States Navy.*

THE military and diplomatic triumphs of Germany, Italy and Japan have radically altered the attitude of the American people on matters of national defense. The democratic form of government under which the United States has grown is vanishing wherever fascist control or influence prevails, and none can say when that process will halt. In an alliance signed on September 27, 1940, the three fascist states agreed to assist one another by military action if any of them is attacked by a power not now involved in the European or Asiatic conflicts—a clear warning that the United States will be forced to fight on two fronts if it resorts to arms overseas. Our sense of security arising from the existence of broad ocean barriers has been severely shaken by the realization that destruction or capture of the British fleet may leave this country without sufficient naval protection. Recalling the events of the War of 1812, some observers are for the first time seriously concerned over the possibility that our territory may ultimately be invaded.<sup>1</sup> The speed of Nazi military operations has emphasized the element of timing in war and preparation for war. The American public, once largely indifferent to the demands of the armed forces especially in matters involving budgetary expense, today sanctions unprecedented peace-time measures to amass modern weapons and trained personnel as rapidly as possible. National defense has taken the center of the political stage.

## THE SCOPE OF "DEFENSE"

At the same time, the scope of this country's strategic commitments has been subjected to searching re-examination.<sup>2</sup> Although the United States, in the past twenty years, has engaged in diplomatic controversy regarding conditions in Europe and the

Far East, it has not hitherto been prepared to support its position in those areas by force. For many years American military strength was maintained at a level more or less adequate for the defense of the continental United States and the Panama Canal. Recently, however, the foreign political situation and the increased range of military weapons have impelled American leaders to consider the potential military balance in an ever-widening area on all sides of the domestic citadel. American security today demands, at the very least, that no opponent be permitted to establish a base anywhere in North America or in the Caribbean, or within effective bombing range of the Panama Canal.<sup>3</sup> To safeguard this expanse, the United States is augmenting its Army and Navy, strengthening the fortifications of its outlying bases, acquiring new outposts, and making joint defense arrangements with Canada and, less formally, with various American republics.

The civilian authorities, meanwhile, have espoused other policies which, if implemented by force, would greatly broaden the scope of American military responsibilities. In revitalizing the Monroe Doctrine and formulating plans for concerted action by the American republics, the Roosevelt Administration has indicated on numerous occasions that it would preserve the territorial integrity of the entire Western Hemisphere against encroachment from overseas, and would not permit the transfer of any territory in the Americas from one non-American power to another.<sup>4</sup> In a recent address,

2. Cf., for example, Livingston Hartley, *Our Maginot Line* (New York, Carrick and Evans, 1939), and George Fielding Eliot, *The Ramparts We Watch* (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939).

3. This is, roughly, the area included under the concept of "quarter-sphere" defense. Cf. Arthur Krock, *The New York Times*, July 11, 1940; *Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1939* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1939), p. 2; testimony of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, in U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Second Supplementary National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941* (Washington, 1940), p. 232.

4. Cf. S. S. Jones and D. P. Myers, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939-June 1940* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1940), pp. 3-96.

1. Cf. address of Walter Lippmann, at New York Herald Tribune forum, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1940.

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President Roosevelt declared that hemisphere defense includes "not only . . . the territory of North and Central and South America and the immediately adjacent islands," but also "the right to the peaceful use of the Atlantic Ocean and of the Pacific Ocean. . . . Unprecedented dangers," the President continued, "have caused the United States to undertake the building of a navy and an air force sufficient to defend all of the coasts of the Americas from any combination of hostile powers."<sup>5</sup> Such a task involves arrangements for the development and use of bases in important strategic areas of South America, perhaps to latitude 40 degrees south (well below Buenos Aires), and including, in particular, stations from which the United States could command the narrow waters separating the shoulder of Brazil from West Africa.<sup>6</sup> According to military experts, moreover, defense of the Western Hemisphere should be active, not passive, rejecting static barriers reminiscent of the Maginot Line in favor of preventive operations directed against an enemy wherever he may be. Effective defense, according to the President, "by its very nature, requires the equipment to attack an aggressor on his route before he can establish strong bases within the territory of American vital interests."<sup>7-9</sup> The activities of the United States' armed forces are consequently restricted not by geographical limits but only by

the combat range of military and naval units and the strategic demands of each specific situation.

Within the framework of these general concepts American foreign policy is still characterized by a high degree of indeterminacy, especially as regards the risk of war through rendering further aid to Britain and protecting our Far Eastern interests. This indeterminate situation permits considerable freedom of diplomatic action but places a heavy burden on the chiefs of the defense services, who find it difficult to foresee the area in which they may be required to function, the scale of their operations, or the extent of assistance by potential allies. They can hardly be censured, therefore, for attempting to build up large forces suitable for use at great distances from the United States.

Forces of this type will be evolved under the armaments program adopted by the United States concomitantly with the Nazi advances in Europe. In a series of enactments, the Seventy-sixth Congress, during its third session, has approved the expenditure of \$17,692,227,930 for national defense, a "two-ocean" navy, and the enforcement of neutrality measures. It is a physical impossibility to spend all of this money in the fiscal year 1941, but the government, by appropriation or authorization, is committed to its eventual disbursement. The funds are allocated as follows:

APPROPRIATIONS AND CONTRACT AUTHORIZATIONS FOR DEFENSE AND NEUTRALITY ENFORCEMENT<sup>10</sup>  
(76th Congress, 3d Session)

	<i>Supplemental and Deficiency Appropria- tions and Authorizations, fiscal year 1940</i>	<i>Direct Appropriations, fiscal year 1941</i>	<i>Contract authorizations, fiscal year 1941</i>	<i>Total, fiscal year 1941</i>	<i>Grand total, 76th Congress, 3d Session</i>
War Dept., Military activities	\$109,498,863	\$5,703,509,885	\$2,979,136,397	\$8,682,646,282	\$8,792,145,145
Navy and Marine Corps	167,628,976	2,546,513,549	822,995,612	3,369,509,161	3,537,138,137
Civil activities contributing to defense and neutrality enforcement	5,751,849	583,892,799	187,300,000	771,192,799	776,944,648
TOTAL	\$282,879,688	\$8,833,916,233	\$3,989,432,009	\$12,823,348,242	\$13,106,227,930

Estimated long-range commitments, in excess of present appropriations, for building "two-ocean" navy . . . . . \$4,586,000,000

Since the potential threat to the Hemisphere lies overseas, the primary military element in American security—and in this sense the first line of Amer-

ican defense—is a navy adequate to dominate the sea communications around the Americas. Behind the fleet there should stand, as a second line of defense with shorter range but great striking power,

5. Speech at Dayton, Ohio, *The New York Times*, October 13, 1940.

6. Cf. Hanson W. Baldwin, *ibid.*, June 2, 1940.

7-9. *Congressional Record*, May 16, 1940, p. 9535.

10. Source: data of Edward T. Taylor, Chairman of House Appropriations Committee, *Congressional Record*, October 24, 1940, pp. 20719-24.

an air force capable of retaining air superiority over any group of hostile planes which could be brought to bear against Western Hemisphere territory. A third defense organism, the land forces of the United States, must repel aggressors who might succeed in reaching our shores; garrison outlying fortifications; protect harbors, naval bases and airdromes to give freedom of action to the naval and air components; and provide an expeditionary force when necessary to carry the war onto enemy soil. Although the soldier is sometimes termed the last line of American defense, his function is of supreme importance, for he alone can force a military decision, and occupy and hold territory.

Under existing legislation the Army of the United States is responsible for virtually all the tasks assigned to the land forces and for a major share of the air defense of the country.<sup>11</sup> Between 1935 and 1940 Army plans were modified in accordance with the thesis of hemisphere defense adopted by the Roosevelt Administration. War Department strategists regarded the Hemisphere as safe from external aggression so long as, first, the Panama Canal remained open for transit by the United States fleet—a condition assured by Army harbor defenses, mobile garrisons and combat aviation in the Canal Zone; and, second, the Army was prepared to cooperate with the Navy in denying bases in the Americas to any opponent, if necessary by preventive occupation.<sup>12</sup> In 1935, therefore, a General Headquarters Air Force was created as a semi-independent striking unit; and after 1937 the War Department centered its efforts on the training of a relatively small, mobile and seasoned aggregation of ground troops ready for instant action in case of emergency.<sup>13</sup>

In May 1940, however, the trend of military thought the world over, and not least in the United States, was profoundly altered by Germany's demonstration of modern offensive tactics. As the possibility loomed that our naval defense might prove temporarily inadequate, Army plans were drastically revised. The amount of new matériel to be acquired was raised sharply; Army reorganization and modernization of methods were carried to much greater lengths; and, most important of all, Army spokesmen declared that increased personnel rather

than equipment was their most pressing need.<sup>14-15</sup> The principle of the mass army, raised by selective service, was once more brought to the foreground—an army with fighting characteristics superior to any in this country's history.

#### TWENTY YEARS OF MILITARY POLICY

It is not generally realized that current plans for Army expansion are directly traceable to a basic military program adopted twenty years ago, as an aftermath of the first World War. In the course of the public debate of 1919-1920 on the future of the armed forces, many Americans urged that the principle of the citizen army raised by compulsory service, adopted during the Civil War and again in 1917, should be perpetuated in time of peace. The Congressional proposal embodying this principle envisaged an army composed of three echelons. In the first place, a Regular Army of long-service professional troops organized in 9 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions was to provide essential garrison forces and instructors for the citizen soldiers. Second, a volunteer National Guard of 22 divisions—twice the size of the Regular component—was to be trained in evening and summer sessions for the dual purpose of preserving order as a state militia and participating in the national effort during a war. Finally, citizens undergoing compulsory military service were to be grouped in 33 Organized Reserve divisions from which they would pass into an unorganized reserve on completion of their training.<sup>16</sup>

Although Congress was unwilling to adopt conscription as a permanent policy in 1920, it did enact a compromise measure—the National Defense Act—setting up a peace establishment consisting of the Regular Army, National Guard and Organized Reserves on the pattern sketched above. The new force was recruited entirely on a volunteer basis.<sup>17</sup> In accordance with law, the country was divided into 9 corps areas for administrative purposes; each was to contain one Regular Army and 2 National Guard divisions. The corps areas were in turn grouped into 4 army regions as a matter of strategic organi-

11. The Marine Corps also guards naval stations, and undertakes landing operations in conjunction with the fleet, while the naval air force fulfills combat and patrol missions in the course of naval operations.

12. Cf. address of Brigadier General George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, War Department *Press Release*, May 6, 1940.

13. D. H. Popper, "American Defense Policies," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 1, 1939, pp. 43-46.

14-15. Testimony of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, in U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Senate Amendments to the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 2-7.

16. Statement of Brigadier General J. M. Palmer, in U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the House Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 10132* (Selective Compulsory Military Training and Service), pp. 44-47.

17. *The National Defense Act, Approved June 3, 1916, as Amended to January 1, 1940* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), especially Section 3, p. 16.

zation.<sup>18</sup> Without compulsory military service, however, only a skeletonized nucleus for the projected system of military organization could be established. Although the Defense Act of 1920 authorized a Regular Army with an enlisted strength of not more than 280,000, subsequent legislation and appropriation acts limited its size to 125,000 between 1922 and 1926, and to 118,750 from then until 1935.<sup>19</sup> The National Guard was maintained at a level of about 190,000 enlisted men, and the Organized Reserve was restricted almost entirely to officers.<sup>20</sup> Consequently, the 9 Regular and 18 Guard infantry divisions fell so far below their indicated strengths that they could not be assembled for training. Many units existed only on paper.

Yet it was never forgotten that the actual forces would have to constitute a framework on which to build a mass army in case of emergency. The Corps Area organizations were maintained intact, even though Regular troops—garrisoned in outlying possessions and in numerous army posts throughout the United States—were ordinarily spread too thin for concentration and training in large units. Vast stocks of military equipment on hand at the close of the war were stored for possible use in the future.<sup>21</sup> Comprehensive plans for selective service legislation were worked out by a Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee.<sup>22</sup> Year by year, moreover, the Officers' Reserve Corps, recruited largely from R.O.T.C. units at schools and colleges, was expanded to a present eligible strength of almost 120,000.<sup>23</sup> While many reserve officers were insufficiently trained for their duties, they constituted a pool from which the commanders of an army numbered in millions might be drawn.

18. For boundaries of these military subdivisions, cf. U.S., 76th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 91, *The Army of the United States* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 32-33.

19. *The National Defense Act*, cited, pp. 15-16.

20. In 1938 the Army began an attempt to induce enlisted men who had completed their term of service to enter an enlisted reserve, but it was estimated that only 37,659 men would have enrolled by July 1, 1940. U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 169.

21. From these stocks Britain's armament was replenished by the sale of 80,000 machine guns, 800 field guns, some 600,000 rifles, and supplies of ammunition. Additional matériel still remains here. Data of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (New York), October 7, 1940.

22. Cf. *American Selective Service: A Brief Account of Its Historical Background and Its Probable Future Form*, Prepared under the Supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 17-24; statement of Major Louis B. Hershey, in *House Military Affairs Committee Hearings on H.R. 10132*, cited, pp. 112 ff.

23. *Hearings of the House Subcommittee on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941*, cited, p. 745.

As international tension increased between 1935 and 1940, Army demands for additional personnel rose in a steeply ascending curve. For a considerable period the War Department insisted that a Regular Army of 165,000 represented an irreducible minimum for defense.<sup>24</sup> This figure was attained in the fiscal year 1939 by a series of gradual increments.<sup>25</sup> Immediately thereafter, in an act approved July 1, 1939, the Army was authorized to increase enlisted strength to approximately 210,000 by June 30, 1940. When war broke out, the President, by Executive Order dated September 8, 1939, directed that the total be brought to 227,000, and the National Guard to 235,000.<sup>26</sup> Military appropriation measures passed in 1940 set the Regular Army goal first at 280,000 men, then at 375,000, and finally removed specific limitations.<sup>27</sup> Meanwhile, on April 3, 1939, the authorized commissioned strength had been increased from 14,659 to 16,719.<sup>28</sup>

Changes in basic War Department plans proceeded step by step as the Department was granted authority to enlist additional personnel. Prior to 1937 it had been anticipated that each of the four divisions which could be fully organized, given a Regular Army of 165,000, would form a nucleus for a field army; and that four field armies might be created for combat in one year of training. In normal times, however, the American public viewed with disapproval any plan suitable for the preparation of a great expeditionary force. Hence, as the theory of hemisphere defense gained currency, the emphasis was shifted to preparation of a small, highly trained professional force quickly available in any crisis. The original protective mobilization plan called for an initial protective force of approximately 21,000 officers and 379,000 enlisted men drawn from the Regular Army, National Guard and Reserves, which was to be ready for combat thirty days after mobilization day. These troops were then to be reinforced by a protective mobilization force—a balanced aggregation of approximately 730,000 men in units and 270,000 for replacements,

24. U.S. War Department, *Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1935* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1935), p. 4.

25. Exclusive of 6,415 Philippine scouts. *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941*, cited, pp. 55-56.

26. U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, September 9, 1939, p. 217.

27. *Public Law No. 611*, 76th Congress, p. 6; *Public Law No. 667*, 76th Congress, p. 4; *Public Law No. 800*, 76th Congress, p. 2. The present strength exceeds 380,000.

28. *Public Law No. 18*, 76th Congress. The increase is being spread over a period of ten years to avoid promotion difficulties, with reserve officers serving in the interim.



the strengthening of overseas garrisons, and other purposes.<sup>29</sup>

The requirements of the plan, however, did not remain stable. In December 1939 Secretary of War Woodring spoke of an initial protective force of "450,000, 500,000, or 600,000";<sup>30</sup> in February 1940 General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, justified a plea for increased effectives by revealing that the 70,000 men in overseas garrisons and approximately 57,000 required to form cadres for training additional units under the protective mobilization plan were not, contrary to general understanding, included in the initial protective force (I.P.F.).<sup>31</sup> By July 24, 1940 the Army program was based on a protective mobilization plan providing for about 800,000 men in units and 400,000 replacements, while the critical (that is, non-commercial) items of equipment were being sought to maintain an army of 2,000,000 men in combat.<sup>32</sup> A month later the concept of the initial protective force was entirely superseded by the doctrine that the protective mobilization force—which was still further expanded from 1,200,000 to 1,400,000 men, including replacements—was to provide only initial cover for the defense of the Northern Hemisphere and the Caribbean, but not South America. To protect the integrity of the entire Western Hemisphere, the General Staff believes, "we may require 3,000,000 men, 4,000,000 or more, because our obligations are scattered in so many directions."<sup>33-34</sup>

Thus, in two decades, the wheel has come full circle, and the country as a whole has once more put its faith in the mass army for national defense. The military plans of 1920 are being put into effect, with suitable modifications. There are indications that the conscription system and the War Department's ultimate munitions plans may envisage the eventual creation of a force of approximately

4,000,000 men, although the present program sets much lower objectives.<sup>35</sup>

#### COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ARMY

Under legislation now in force, the Army expects to have 1,400,000 men in training and service with the colors by July 1, 1941.<sup>36</sup> They are to be procured as follows:

1. By enlarging the Regular Army, perhaps to an ultimate strength of 400-500,000. Considerable progress has been made toward this goal as a result of intense recruiting. The reluctance of many individuals to volunteer for the normal three-year term of service has been overcome by the approach of conscription and a limited acceptance of one-year enlistments. By the end of November there were about 380,000 Regular troops.

2. By calling the National Guard into active service and bringing all National Guard units as close as possible to their calculated peace or maintenance strength, totaling 328,451, through recruiting of volunteers. It is estimated that the volunteer personnel of the Guard will level off at approximately 245,000 men. Since, even during a war, the militia is not subject to full federal control without Congressional action, the President was authorized by resolution approved August 27, 1940 "to order into the active military service of the United States for a period of twelve consecutive months each, any or all members and units of any or all reserve components of the Army" subject to certain exceptions for persons under 18 years of age and individuals with dependents. Personnel drafted into active service under this authority are not to be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere, except in United States territories and possessions, including the Philippine Islands, unless, of course, this stipulation should be altered by a future session of Congress.<sup>37-38</sup>

3. By calling to active duty under the same authority a total of 42,262 reserve officers from the Officers' Reserve Corps, to supplement the Regular Army officers and some 15,000 officers of the National Guard. By July 1, 1941 the number of Army reserve officers on extended active duty should reach 55,592. These reserve officers will meet the need for increased officer personnel and will gain experience in command and leadership.<sup>39</sup>

4. By the selection of sufficient conscripts to bring the total enlisted strength of the Army as a whole to 1,399,441 men. The exact number of trainees to be

29. Cf. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1938* (Washington, 1938), pp. 1-6; U.S., 75th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1939* (Washington, 1938), pp. 6-8.

30. *Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1939* (Washington, 1939), p. 4.

31. Men required for the various service commands of corps areas were also excluded from the I.P.F. While it was logical to confine the I.P.F. to organized units within the United States, ready for action, the discovery that this had been done came as a surprise to the House Appropriations Committee. Cf. *Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1941*, cited, pp. 28, 47, 48; U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *House Report No. 1912 on H.R. 9209*, p. 3.

32. U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill for 1941* (Washington, 1940), pp. 109, 124.

33-34. Testimony of General Marshall, *Hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations on the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 232.

35. Cf. testimony of General Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, *ibid.*, p. 126; *House Hearings on the Second Supplemental Defense Bill*, cited, p. 211.

36. U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *House Report No. 2983 on H.R. 10572* (Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriations, 1941), p. 3.

37-38. *Public Resolution No. 96*, 76th Congress; U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the Senate Military Affairs Committee on S.J. Res. 286 Ordering Reserve Components and Retired Personnel into Active Military Service*, esp. pp. 4-6, 14, 15, 19.

39. *House Report No. 2983*, cited, pp. 4, 8.

inducted will depend on the Army's success in filling the ranks of the Regular Army and National Guard with volunteers; but under existing legislation, no more than 800,000 may be called before July 1, 1941, and no more than 900,000 annually in any subsequent year.<sup>40</sup>

The size and composition of the new Army were determined not by accident, but by a calculation of the largest balanced force which should be constructed on the framework of the 9 Regular and 18 National Guard infantry divisions. In ordering out the Guard and utilizing these 27 divisions as cadres to be raised to war strength by trainees, the General Staff hoped to gain time by bringing existing organizations to a state of high efficiency, rather than emasculate them to provide instructors for entirely new units of conscripts.<sup>41</sup> Under the present plan, the 27 infantry divisions are to be supported by certain corps, army and G.H.Q. units, including artillery, 2 cavalry divisions and 4 mechanized divisions. This force, comprising the field army of the United States, should total approximately 850,000 men. To it would be added some 160,000 members of the Air Corps, at least 100,000 troops in overseas garrisons, some 50,000 men for coastal and anti-aircraft defenses, and perhaps 200,000 more for replacements, the training of recruits, general administration and supply, and miscellaneous purposes.<sup>42</sup>

While this is the existing goal, it is likely to be revised sharply upward when the great mass of partially trained man power is molded into a smoothly functioning military machine. General Marshall has stated that his ultimate objective is an army of 45 divisions and 10 armored divisions, amounting to at least 2,000,000 men.<sup>43</sup> And as selective service trainees are passed into the reserve, the combat strength of the army in the field will be steadily enhanced. By April 1, 1945, according to the War Department, the new army will include 375,000 men and 16,719 officers in the Regular Army; 240,850 men and 15,000 officers in the National Guard; and 3,000,000 men and 40,000 to 60,000 officers in the trained reserves.<sup>44</sup> Even in war, no force of this magnitude could possibly be raised without resort to conscription.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 3; *Public Law No. 800*, 76th Congress, 3d Session, p. 2; *Public Law No. 783*, 76th Congress, p. 2.

41. On the importance of this point, cf. testimony of General Marshall, U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, *Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs on S. 4164* (Compulsory Military Training and Service), pp. 328-29.

42. Cf. Hanson W. Baldwin, "The New American Army," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), October 1940, pp. 39-40.

43. Address to Civilian Aides to the Secretary of War, *The New York Times*, July 18, 1940.

44. Cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 19, 1940, p. 175.

#### SELECTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE-TIME

That the United States Congress, for the first time in its history, should approve the introduction of peace-time compulsory selective service is a striking testimonial to the sense of peril which gripped the American people after May 1940. The decision was deliberately taken after lengthy public and Congressional debate. Once the issue was settled, the well-prepared machinery of selection went smoothly into operation, with little visible evidence of the enormous social and political effects it is certain to entail.

Under the selective training and service act of 1940, approved September 16, more than 16,000,000 male residents of the United States between the ages of 21 and 35 inclusive were registered on October 16, 1940. All male citizens, or aliens with first papers, within this age range are liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States until May 14, 1945, with the exception of military and reserve personnel, certain public officials, and ministers and theological students.<sup>45</sup> The President, however, is given broad powers to grant deferment—not exemption—from service to persons in essential occupations, those with dependents, and those physically, mentally or morally deficient or defective. To avoid some of the abuses of conscription during the last war, conscientious objectors "by reason of religious training and belief" are to be assigned to noncombatant service, or work of national importance under civilian direction.

Except in time of war, no more than 900,000 trainees impartially selected on a state and district quota basis may be in service at any time; and except when Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, the period of training and service is twelve months. Since men may not be inducted until adequate provision is made for shelter, sanitary facilities, and medical care, the War Department has embarked on an extensive program to construct 31 new camps and cantonments, each capable of housing one or more divisions, as well as 204 other housing projects.<sup>46</sup> Pay, allowances and other benefits for men who are chosen and passed into the reserve are those prescribed for enlisted men and reserves of similar grade and length of service under the law. As a result, trainees serve for four months at \$21 per month, and thereafter at \$30—a wage far above that of conscripts in foreign armies.<sup>47</sup> Like mem-

45. For text of the law, cf. *Public No. 783*, 76th Congress.

46. Most of these projects are scheduled for completion by December 15, 1940, but in some instances construction is lagging behind schedule.

47. Trainees who are promoted or gain specialist ratings receive additional compensation.

bers of the National Guard and reserve components, trainees in the Army are not to be employed outside the Western Hemisphere and United States possessions. After completion of service, they are transferred to a reserve in which they remain for ten years. During this period, they are subject to additional periods of training as may be prescribed by law. Provision is made to preserve the jobs and seniority status of trainees wherever possible.

Following a national lottery held on October 29, 1940 to determine the order of selection, 6,500 local boards all over the country began the classification of registrants into available and deferred groups.<sup>48</sup> Plans have been made to call up 800,000 men by June 15, 1941. The first small increments were summoned in November 1940, with increasing numbers scheduled for induction in subsequent months.<sup>49</sup> On the expiration of the act, in 1945, about 3,400,000 men will probably have received training, unless the outbreak of war forces acceleration of the program. Despite the shortage of modern equipment for combat purposes, it is expected that stocks of most specialized weapons will be adequate for instruction until new production is sufficiently advanced to supply army needs.<sup>50</sup>

#### CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND METHOD

The adoption of selective service and the hasty expansion of the armed forces provide the most stringent test of the Army's organizing capacity since 1918. At that time serious flaws were revealed, not only in the administrative work of the War Department but in the ability of many Army officers and the whole regimen of discipline and command as applied to citizen soldiers. In the intervening years, critics of the system have made many suggestions for change.<sup>51</sup> Today, after a static period following the last war, Army organization and methods are gradually being modernized in many respects.

48. For details on the organization of the selective service system, classification and selection, induction, physical standards, etc., cf. *Selective Service Regulations*, Volumes 1-6 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940).

49. For the induction schedule, the early portion of which will be somewhat delayed, cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 19, 1940, p. 176.

50. *Hearings before the House Military Affairs Committee on H.R. 10312*, cited, p. 110. For description of the training program, cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, September 28, 1940, p. 102; October 5, 1940, p. 132; William H. Baumer, Jr. and Sidney F. Giffin, "21 to 35" (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1940), pp. 93-127.

51. Cf., for example, Major General Johnson Hagood, *We Can Defend America* (Garden City, Doubleday Doran, 1937); Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson, *Battle Shield of the Republic* (New York, Macmillan, 1940); and numerous articles and comments in the *Infantry Journal* (Washington), and other service periodicals, such as Major J. U. Ayotte's article, "Infantry Combat Training," *Infantry Journal*, July-August 1940, pp. 358-63.

One important development has been a recent reorganization placing all of the field forces under a chain of command specifically designed to facilitate troop training. Prior to July 1940 there were no effective tactical—i.e., fighting force—commands in the continental United States larger than the division, except for the General Headquarters Air Force. Supervision of training ordinarily rested with the Corps Area Commander, who was also burdened with many other functions of supply and administration. Now, however, the responsibility for training in the field is lodged in a newly organized General Headquarters, while the War Department General Staff serves as a planning and policy-making body.<sup>52</sup> Beneath the GHQ stands the basic structure of the Army, adapted to current training necessities. The commanders of the 4 field armies, holding the rank of Lieutenant General, assume command of all forces except certain units attached specifically to the GHQ. Each of 9 newly created tactical corps—in which are contained the 9 Regular and 18 National Guard infantry divisions—constitutes a section of one of the field armies.<sup>53</sup> Henceforth the old Corps Area commands will specialize exclusively in routine supply and administrative functions. The new system leaves combat troops free for the greatest possible measure of intensive training.<sup>54</sup>

The expansion of the Army, moreover, has resulted in an increase in the number of active general officers to 230, thus providing an infusion of new blood in the higher command as well as the possibility of more rapid promotion in all ranks. Opportunity is therefore afforded to reward outstanding leadership in training. Military instruction methods are gradually being altered to prepare the soldier for battle efficiency with a minimum of wasted time and effort. The preoccupation with close order drill, for ceremonial purposes and the inculcation of discipline, has been reduced by adoption of simpler and more flexible formations. Guardhouse confinement

52. The first Chief of Staff of the new GHQ is Major General Lesley J. McNair. But over-all direction of the field forces is entrusted to General George C. Marshall, who is exercising the dual function of Chief of Staff of the Army and Commanding General of the Field Forces. This arrangement has been criticized as undue centralization of authority in the top brackets of command, although it might eliminate some of our command difficulties during the last war. Cf. *The New York Times* editorial, October 3, 1940.

53. For data on location and tactical grouping of the components of the field forces, cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 12, 1940, pp. 149, 168. For the present, the original pattern of combining one Regular Army Division and two National Guard divisions in each corps is not being followed.

54. For a detailed description of the training organization, cf. address of Brigadier General Frank M. Andrews, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, October 23, 1940. War Department *Press Release*, October 23, 1940.



is to be minimized in favor of forms of disciplinary action which do not involve absence from training. Some of the rigidity of military etiquette is in course of modification. Maneuvers and exercises are being made more realistic, now that sufficient funds have been provided. And much has been done to lessen the time spent on fatigue, administrative service, and camp construction by combat troops.<sup>55</sup> The Army is making a special effort to preserve high morale among those recently called to serve.

#### THE BLITZKRIEG AND ARMY TACTICS

Germany's successful offensives in Western Europe have profoundly influenced military thought and organization in this country, but they have not for the most part invalidated the basic doctrines and principles on which American practice rests.<sup>56</sup> The outstanding features of the German Army's attacks have been carefully noted by American strategists. Yet the General Staff is apparently using caution in the application of German techniques, since the American Army must be prepared to fight under conditions and in terrain quite different from those of the Flanders plain.<sup>57</sup> The conduct of the *Blitzkrieg* has led American officers to place particular emphasis on two elements of contemporary military training. First, success in war today depends not merely on machines—planes, tanks, and guns—but on the physically hardened, seasoned, and well-trained soldier-technicians who fight on the battlefield. The advent of mechanization has increased rather than diminished the toughness required for survival under strain and made it more necessary than ever to bring troops to the peak of physical perfection. Second, and even more important, victory demands the employment of a balanced, highly organized combat team, with perfect coordination within and between all arms. Such a team can be whipped into shape only by intensive practice in the cooperative effort needed in battle.<sup>58</sup>

The foot-soldier is still regarded as the decisive component of the team; other arms perform their duties in order to keep him moving forward. Infantry tactics today call for wide dispersion of forces, with considerable decentralization of command and consequent reliance on the judgment and initiative of noncommissioned and enlisted personnel. The contrast with World War methods is

marked: where three-quarters of enlisted infantry personnel were formerly riflemen, less than one-third now carry the rifle. The bulk of the remainder operate and service machine guns, mortars and other weapons, which constitute a mobile "base of fire" furnishing close support for the advancing infantry. Imbued with an aggressive spirit, the various elements of the infantry battalion and regiment are trained to coordinate their fire and movement; to work in harmony with the artillery, tanks, and attack aviation assigned to support them; and to deepen and widen any breaches in the enemy line with the utmost rapidity, so as to disorganize enemy resistance.<sup>59</sup>

Two types of infantry divisions are now to be found in the Army. In 1939 the 9 Regular divisions adopted the "triangular" or "streamlined" organization, with 3 regiments replacing the 4 regiments (combined in 2 brigades) of the old, World War type, "square" division, which is retained with modifications by the National Guard. As recently reorganized, the triangular division contains about 14,700 officers and men, as compared with 18,500 in the Guard units; but the former is more mobile and flexible and possesses greater fire-power. While it is not completely motorized, it has sufficient motor vehicles to shuttle its personnel and equipment about 100 miles per day. Each infantry regiment of the triangular division contains an anti-tank company equipped with anti-tank guns and is liberally supplied with heavy and light mortars and machine guns for close support fire.<sup>60</sup> The division also has a mechanized reconnaissance troop of armored scout cars and motorcycles.<sup>61</sup> It is expected that one triangular division may be completely motorized, and that one may be specially trained for landing operations.<sup>62</sup>

Designated units of field artillery are placed in support of each division and corps, where their function is to assist the movement of the entire force through use of their destructive fire.<sup>63</sup> In the tri-

55. Cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 5, 1940, pp. 113, 132; *ibid.*, October 26, 1940, p. 203.

56. Address of Brigadier General F. M. Andrews, War Department *Press Release*, October 23, 1940, p. 6.

57. For an excellent sample of this sort of critical adaptation, cf. Captain Paul W. Thompson, "Engineers in the Blitzkrieg," *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940, pp. 424-32.

58. These points were lucidly expressed in a broadcast by General Marshall on September 16, 1940. For text, cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, September 21, 1940, p. 78.

59. Cf. statement of Major General George A. Lynch, Chief of Infantry, *ibid.*, November 16, 1940, p. 281; U.S., War Department, *Infantry Field Manual: Organization and Tactics of Infantry: The Rifle Battalion* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), *passim*.

60. On the purposes, development, and characteristics of some of these weapons, cf. Captain D. J. Martin, "Modern Trench Mortars," *Army Ordnance* (Washington), July-August 1940, pp. 29-32; Brigadier General Earl McFarland, "Light Machine Guns," *ibid.*, September-October 1940.

61. For details regarding organization of triangular division, cf. *Army and Navy Journal*, September 14, 1940, pp. 25, 49; *ibid.*, September 21, 1940, p. 80; Baldwin, "The New American Army," cited, pp. 40, 41.

62. *Ibid.*

63. Cf. U.S., War Department, *Field Artillery Field Manual: Tactics and Technique* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 69 ff.

angular, but not in the square, divisions the 75-mm. guns which have served as the basic weapon of American field artillery since the last war are now giving way to a modern weapon of larger caliber. Divisional artillery for these units is henceforth to consist of three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers, which are comparable to the artillery used in German divisions although of American design and manufacture, and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. Motorized anti-aircraft machine guns and anti-tank guns are provided for defense of the highly vulnerable artillery. A special anti-tank battery attached to the 155-mm. battalion employs eight 75-mm. guns for operations against tanks—the only remaining group of such weapons in the triangular division.<sup>64</sup> For the time being, however, 75-mm. guns will continue to be used, until the 105-mm. howitzer can be delivered to the troops. As of August 1, 1940, none of the 240 on order was actually on hand. There were 241 75-mm. guns whose performance had been made much more effective by extensive modernization, as well as some 1,500 others which had been adapted for high-speed towing by trucks.<sup>65</sup> All National Guard divisional artillery is already motorized, and it is probable that all artillery units of the Regular divisions will have been converted in the near future. Horse-drawn 75-mm. gun units continue in existence as corps artillery.<sup>66</sup>

#### CAVALRY REORGANIZATION

Despite the universal trend toward mechanization, the Army clings tenaciously to horse cavalry and artillery. This policy is defended on the ground that motor vehicles cannot be operated along the southern United States border and in the rugged, undeveloped terrain of much of the Western Hemisphere. Military authorities have noted that even in the Low Countries and France, where a well-constructed road network exists, the German army employed an estimated 800,000 horses in its victorious campaign.<sup>67</sup> American cavalry, moreover, has long since passed the period of massed saber charges and now fights for the most part on foot, using its mounts to reach advantageous positions with the greatest possible speed. It is supported by the same echelons as the infantry division: modern

artillery (horse and motorized), engineer, signal, ordnance and medical troops. Much of the cavalry division is motorized, and all its supplies are carried in motor trains. During periods of concentration its mobile fire-power may be employed to protect infantry and artillery from surprise attacks and screen them from observation by ground troops, while it gains detailed information regarding the enemy by means of ground reconnaissance. In battle it may be used to attack enemy weak points or to strike the opponent in flank or rear; for pursuit and destruction; or as a mobile reserve.<sup>68</sup> In recent legislation, funds have been allocated for about 20,000 additional horses, principally for new cavalry units.<sup>69</sup>

Nevertheless, military developments in Europe have proved that under most circumstances aircraft and mechanized forces can perform the traditional functions of cavalry. Gradually, therefore, the proportion of horse to motor components in existing American cavalry units is falling. Under a recent reorganization of the cavalry division, the personnel strength was raised from 500 officers and 8,500 men to 600 officers and 9,500 men; the number of horses declined from 8,000 to 6,000; and the number of motor vehicles jumped from 350 to 800. A motor-cycle troop providing a highly mobile reserve of riflemen has been added to the reconnaissance squadron of horse and armored combat car troops, while anti-tank guns, machine guns and mortars are utilized in greater numbers. Horses as well as equipment may be transported by truck.<sup>70</sup> One Regular Army cavalry division is being reorganized on this pattern, and a second is being assembled. At the same time, the 4 National Guard cavalry divisions are being converted into 7 corps cavalry reconnaissance regiments which, with two similar units from the Regular Army, will provide one for each tactical corps. These regiments, containing about 60 per cent mechanized elements, will transport their 450 horses habitually by truck, while light scout cars and motorcycles make up the mechanized squadron.<sup>71</sup>

#### MODERNIZING THE COAST ARTILLERY

During the World War the seacoast defenses of the United States were stripped of their men and of many guns for service in France and were never restored to their previous status. Many seacoast bat-

64. For organization tables of the newly approved divisional artillery, triangular division, cf. *Field Artillery Journal* (Washington), September-October 1940, pp. 336-37.

65. Data furnished by General Marshall, *Congressional Record*, September 5, 1940, p. 17546; *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 573; *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, pp. 29, 32.

66. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 26, 1940, p. 213.

67. *Congressional Record*, September 26, 1940, pp. 19186-87.

68. Cf. testimony of Major General John K. Herr, Chief of Cavalry, *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 676-83.

69. *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 87; *Public No. 800*, 76th Congress, p. 3.

70. *Army and Navy Journal*, September 28, 1940, p. 97.

71. *Loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, November 9, 1940, p. 267; *New York Herald Tribune*, October 11, 1940.

teries and their fire control equipment are antiquated; some guns have not been fired for twenty years or more.<sup>72</sup> With the possibility of a two-ocean naval conflict for which the fleet might prove inadequate, and the prospect of increasing air bombardment range, the need for coastal protection is once again assuming great importance. Details regarding coastal defenses are closely guarded secrets, but it is known that defense projects have been drawn up for all important harbors and coastal areas in the United States and for Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Alaska. In the case of overseas possessions, these embrace all requirements for a coordinated, reasonably adequate defense against a major attack. Panama and Hawaii are already strongly fortified, and their defenses are being steadily augmented. New installations are being set up in Puerto Rico. For the continental United States, harbor defense is much less elaborate, the projects dealing only with requirements directly pertinent to coast defense, including artillery and fortifications, anti-aircraft matériel, communications systems, roads, mines operated from the shore, etc.<sup>73-74</sup> In recent years funds have been appropriated for modernization of important West Coast positions, but not until 1940 were large sums finally made available for projects on the Atlantic. In general, new artillery consists of mobile guns transported by rail or motor, rather than fixed equipment which cannot be moved to threatened areas nor shifted to avoid observation and attack by hostile aircraft.

Coast Artillery regiments are now divided into harbor defense and anti-aircraft organizations. The numbers of the latter are being expanded as rapidly as the procurement of highly specialized apparatus such as searchlights, anti-aircraft guns, machine guns, sound locators, height finders and directors permits. Production of some important items is just beginning, particularly the 90-mm. anti-aircraft gun which is far more effective than the standard 3-inch model, and a secret ray detector said to spot planes more than 100 miles away.<sup>75</sup> Defense against enemy aircraft, if they should ever reach this country, will be facilitated by the organization this year of the First Air Defense Command, covering all the north-eastern states between the Virginia capes and Duluth, and operating through a network of civilian

observation posts.<sup>76</sup> Their work is supplemented by an Aircraft Warning Service with detecting equipment located in outlying possessions as well as in the United States.<sup>77</sup> The Air Defense Command will coordinate the work of observation, anti-aircraft fire, and interception by pursuit planes.

#### THE ARMORED FORCE

In no component save the Air Corps were the consequences of the *Blitzkrieg* more immediately apparent than among the Army's mechanized units. Prior to the smashing success of the German armored divisions, the War Department had been experimenting with mechanized formations, but only on a tentative scale. As late as February 1940, the protective mobilization plan requirements for the infantry called for only 734 light and 194 medium tanks, while the immediate cavalry program stipulated the addition of but two combat car squadrons and a scout car troop.<sup>78</sup> A force approximating a mechanized division was made up for test by adding other units to the mechanized cavalry brigade, notably a motorized infantry regiment to serve as a holding force for captured territory. A group of about 300 infantry tanks was also concentrated for experimental exercises.<sup>79</sup> Maximum progress, however, had been hampered for years by the division of responsibility for mechanized forces between the infantry and the cavalry.

This defect was remedied, and a marked impetus was given to the development of mechanization, by the incorporation in July 1940 of infantry and cavalry tanks in an Armored Corps of two divisions, under the direction of an Armored Field Force Commander.<sup>80</sup> Each division is to contain about 9,500 officers and men. It will include field artillery and motorized infantry, and will consist of approximately 700 armored vehicles, 300 guns and howitzers of various calibers, and over 6,500 automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Aircraft are to be incorporated for reconnaissance and liaison purposes, but not yet for coordinated attack on enemy objectives.<sup>81</sup> As a result of its analysis of the German

76. *Ibid.*

77. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 247-52.

78. *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 5. The infantry light tank and the cavalry combat car originally had similar characteristics, but the infantry added armor and armament to its weapon at the expense of speed and mobility. Cf. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 59. The scout car has little armor.

79. *Ibid.*

80. Major General Adna R. Chaffee, formerly commander of the mechanized cavalry brigade. *Army and Navy Journal*, July 6, 1940, p. 1097.

81. *Loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, September 14, 1940, p. 46.

72. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 32.

73-74. U.S., 76th Congress, 1st Session, *Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations on the Second Deficiency Appropriation Bill for 1939* (Washington, 1939), pp. 472-75; *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 687-91.

75. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 55, 56, 312-15; *The New York Times*, August 10, 1940.



campaigns, the War Department has fixed a ratio of about two and a half light tanks to one medium tank in the armored divisions, compared with a German ratio of four to one.<sup>82</sup> Equipment for the Armored Corps of two divisions is to include 574 light tanks, 220 medium tanks, 588 scout cars, 56 passenger cars, 816 motorcycles, 402 motor tricycles, and 2,017 trucks.<sup>83</sup> The combat echelon of each division is formed by two light armored regiments, one medium armored regiment, a motorized engineer battalion, and an armored field artillery regiment, with a motorized rifle regiment and field artillery in support. This organization is generally similar to that of the German *Panzerdivision*, well adapted to rapid exploitation of a breach in the enemy line.<sup>84</sup> Two more armored divisions are to be formed in June 1941, with an ultimate goal of ten; and a force of heavy tanks of perhaps 40 to 70 tons is in prospect to serve as "land battleships" accompanying the infantry in a break-through of the enemy line.<sup>85</sup>

At present the matériel available is not yet sufficient even for the existing units. When it was formed in July 1940 the Armored Force possessed approximately 400 tanks of all ages and types. Recently, however, light tanks have been delivered at a rate of 100 per month.<sup>86</sup> The trend is toward heavier units: the weight of the so-called light tank has risen from 10 to 13 tons in latest models. Medium tanks, redesigned as a result of German operations, are receiving heavier armor and armament, and will be delivered beginning in May 1941. They will weigh approximately 25 tons, as compared with 17.5 to 19 tons for older models.<sup>87</sup> New developments and tactics will be studied and approved by the Armored Force Board, and instruction will be carried on by the Armored Force School, as in the case of the combat arms.

#### AIR CORPS DEVELOPMENTS

The psychological as well as the military consequences of air power in the European war have

fired the imagination and aroused the fears of the American people, and have given rise to a phenomenal drive for expansion of the United States' military and naval air forces. With 14,300 planes on order in this country for Britain, the purchase of 12,000 more planned, and manufacturers under contract for 26,000 for our own defense needs, it seems strange to recall that under a construction program adopted in 1939 the Army set as its goal a force of 5,500 airplanes, 2,200 of which were to be kept in reserve.<sup>88</sup> Pursuant to this earlier objective, the personnel of the Air Corps was to be increased from 21,500 to almost 45,000 enlisted men during the fiscal year 1940.<sup>89</sup>

But in May 1940 the War Department, apparently caught unprepared by the overwhelming demand for scores of thousands of planes, began rapidly to plan for larger forces. For months the Air Corps' objectives remained indeterminate. By October 1940, however, it was clear that approximately 18,000 planes had been ordered or received. Of these, 12,800 of all classes and types, including basic and advanced training planes, are to be delivered and manned before the end of 1942. The remainder are to serve as an equipment reserve.<sup>90</sup> No precise classification of the types of planes on order is available, but a high proportion of early deliveries must necessarily consist of training rather than combat ships.<sup>91</sup>

These changes have necessitated thoroughgoing reorganization of the Air Corps. The General Headquarters Air Force, in which combat planes are concentrated to carry out the strategic mission of American aviation, retains its position as striking arm now responsible only to the new Army GHQ. The country has been subdivided into four air districts—a move which decentralizes training and inspection duties and provides for the development of commanders and staffs for such special task forces as may be required for operation in war. The lower echelons of command are to be greatly increased in number as quickly as planes and personnel become available.<sup>92</sup> The four wings of the Air Corps in the United States are to be expanded to 17—11 bom-

82. German light tanks weigh only 6 and 8 tons, as against 10 to 13 tons for the American models. The term "combat car," adopted by the cavalry because tanks were by law infantry weapons, is now abolished. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1940, p. 1121.

83. For organization chart of the Armored Corps, cf. *Infantry Journal*, September-October 1940, pp. 436-39.

84. "Tanks in Force," *Army and Navy Journal*, July 27, 1940, pp. 1169-70.

85. *Loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, October 19, 1940, p. 177. Cf. Captain C. R. Kutz, "Break-Through Tanks: Will They Bring Freedom of Action to Armored Divisions?" *Army Ordnance*, November-December 1940, pp. 242-45.

86. William S. Knudsen, *The New York Times*, October 9, 1940. For summary of various types of light and medium tanks, cf. *Army Ordnance*, September-October 1940, p. 145.

87. *United States News* (Washington), November 1, 1940, p. 12.

88. For earlier history of the Air Corps, cf. D. H. Popper, "American Defense Policies," cited, pp. 45-46.

89. In February 1940 the Army was still working on this basis. Cf. *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 7, 519.

90. War Department Press Release, October 24, 1940; *The New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 25, 1940. There are reports that the objective may be further increased.

91. Even when the program is completed, 30 to 40 per cent of the 18,000 planes will be trainers. *House Subcommittee Hearings on the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 98.

92. A squadron consists of 8 to 25 planes, depending on the type; from 2 to 4 squadrons compose a group; and 2 or more groups make up a wing. There are now 109 squadrons and 4,000 pilots.



bardment and 6 pursuit—embracing 54 combat groups in place of 25 at present.<sup>93</sup> Within the Army of 1,400,000 men, the Air Corps will total 163,000, of whom about 20,000 will be pilots (if that number can be trained by July 1, 1942) and most of the remainder other types of flying and non-flying specialists.<sup>94</sup>

Provision of adequate base facilities and instruction must go hand in hand with expansion of the Air Corps. Army air bases are rapidly being built or enlarged in all parts of the United States and its territories.<sup>95</sup> Under 1941 appropriations, important new stations are under construction at Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts (Westover Field), and near Tampa, Florida (MacDill Field), for protection of the north and south Atlantic approaches to the United States. Storage depots have been located in areas relatively safe from air attack, at Ogden, Utah, and Mobile, Alabama. New bases are rising at Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Panama. Most other Air Corps posts are being expanded to accommodate increased personnel.<sup>96</sup> Since the Army and Navy now find their 78 airdromes in the United States inadequate, moreover, \$40,000,000 has been appropriated as the first installment of a contemplated \$550,000,000 program of the Civil Aeronautics Board for construction and improvement of airports for defense and pilot training.<sup>97-98</sup>

A serious bottleneck exists with respect to instructors and pilots, whose training must necessarily be prolonged. The 1940 program originally provided for the procurement of 2,400 pilots in two years, but this objective was quickly raised to 7,000, and then to 12,000, pilots per year. Eight additional Army flight and two more gunnery schools are being established for the more advanced phases of training, with primary instruction given at 18 civilian flying schools.<sup>99</sup> During the fiscal year 1941, the Civilian Aeronautics Board is providing primary flight training to approximately 45,000 student pilots, and secondary and specialized instruction to

approximately 30,000, but the direct military value of this enterprise is in dispute.<sup>100</sup>

Expansion of the Air Corps has been accompanied by a recrudescence of the perennial debate over the desirability of an air force separate from and co-equal with the Army and Navy. Such a force, it is maintained, would develop independent air power to the utmost once it was freed from the hampering grip of generals and admirals inexperienced in the air and eager primarily to build "balanced" land and sea forces. Supporters of this view argue that, aside from planes needed for continuous cooperation with the two senior services, air strength should be developed and controlled by airmen. Had that been the case, they assert, the United States would now have a powerful air force in being rather than on order, and would be prepared to strengthen its aviation rapidly as a result of European developments. On the other hand, the predominant opinion within the Army and Navy, and in more conservative military circles, is hostile to any move which would divide control of the fighting forces between three departments when it is difficult enough to coordinate the existing two. According to these groups, air power is now being developed to the fullest possible extent for all probable air missions. Nothing but bickering and confusion would result from reorganizing the defense establishment at this critical moment, even if—as many air force proponents urge—all the services were made subordinate to a unified department of national defense.<sup>101</sup>

For this reason no change in the existing system is expected in the immediate future. The GHQ Air Force will probably assume more and more characteristics of an independent arm as it passes from the training to the performance stage. Its strategic doctrine stresses the maintenance of air superiority in the Western Hemisphere, primarily through development of a long-range bomber force operating from suitable bases to prevent the establishment of an enemy foothold.<sup>102</sup> Failure to provide for more than 178 of the distinctively American type of long-range bomber in the 5,500-plane program of 1939 gave rise to considerable criticism, much of which has since been dissipated by a recent decision to acquire about 1,100 of these craft

93. *Army and Navy Journal*, October 26, 1940, p. 201. There will also be 6 transport groups. Aviation components of the Hawaiian and Panama Canal Departments will be strengthened and formed into Department Air Forces under the Department Commander, thus achieving unity of command.

94. *House Subcommittee Hearings on Third Supplementary National Defense Appropriation Bill*, cited, p. 98.

95. In general accord with the Wilcox air base program of 1935. Cf. Popper, "American Defense Policies," cited, p. 46.

96. Cf. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 75-79, 212.

97-98. First Civil Functions Appropriation Act, 1941. *The New York Times*, October 5, 1940; U.S., 76th Congress, 3d Session, Supplement to Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on the First Supplemental Civil Functions Appropriation Bill for 1941 (Washington, 1940), pp. 27 ff., 55.

99. *House Hearings on the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 90 ff., 37.

100. Supplement to Hearings on First Supplemental Civil Functions Bill, cited, pp. 36 ff.; *Public Law No. 667*, 76th Congress.

101. The case for a separate air service and a unified defense department is ably presented by Cy Caldwell, in *New York Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1940; the case against them, by G. F. Eliot, *ibid.*, October 25, 1940. Cf. also O. G. Villard, *Our Military Chaos* (New York, Knopf, 1939), Chap. VIII; Al Williams, *Airpower* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1940), pp. 13, 88 ff., 363 ff.

102. Address by Major General Delos C. Emmons, War Department Press Release, September 30, 1939.

by the end of 1942.<sup>103</sup> At the same time, the Army has been warned against the danger of concentrating exclusively on an independent striking force. Since one key to the German success was the amazing coordination of attack aviation and offensive ground formations, the War Department is being urged to strengthen its air units operating in conjunction with the field armies. The United States was a pioneer in the development of this type of tactics but appears to have neglected them in recent years.<sup>104</sup>

#### PROPOSALS VERSUS PERFORMANCE

While critics may dissent from individual features of the Army's great augmentation programs, it can scarcely be denied that they represent a tremendous stride in the direction of "total defense" of the country. On the whole, they reveal that the General Staff is fully aware of modern military trends and is applying them with all practicable speed. Announced objectives are in many cases still tentative, permitting a high degree of flexibility to meet changing conditions. If there has been evidence of confusion, it has not, given the unprecedented circumstances, been excessive.

The gap which separates proposal and performance, however, may provide grounds for concern. The Army as it exists today is but a nucleus for the great force of the future. In two respects—matériel and personnel—it is and must remain deficient for many months to come. For this, responsibility must be divided between Congress, the Bureau of the Budget, and the nation on the one hand, and the War Department on the other. Until recently, Congress and the Budget Bureau have pruned down the Army's requests for funds—to such an extent, indeed, that in the sixteen years 1925-40 only \$854,556,000 was devoted to augmentation, modernization and replacement of arms and equipment. Of this sum, \$509,900,000 went to the Air Corps and only \$344,656,000 to the ground elements of the Army—an average of only \$21,500,000 per year for the latter.<sup>105</sup> On the other hand, the War Department has been censured for lack of vision and imagination in planning for the future. It has been accused of delaying the adoption of

new weapons; ordering constant changes in design and unduly complicated specifications instead of rushing production; and retarding progress by excessively bureaucratic procedure.<sup>106</sup>

In any event, the shortage of new matériel is pressing and must remain so for a considerable period. It is difficult to measure the precise extent of this shortage because the reorganization of tactical units and the addition of new units have resulted in an ascending spiral of requirements for equipment. The latest official summary of matériel on hand and on order—which by no means includes all future needs—reveals the status as of August 1, 1940 (see table opposite).

Because of the time necessary to place many of these items in production, deliveries will not be great until the summer of 1941, but should flow in increasing volume thereafter until completion of existing programs for "an army fit to meet any challenge" about March 1942.<sup>107</sup> Meanwhile, there are glaring deficiencies in the equipment of many units, some of which have already been mentioned. The semi-automatic rifle adopted as standard for the infantryman—a weapon which greatly increases infantry fire-power—is supplied to only a fraction of the troops. The newer models of tanks, artillery, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons are still almost completely lacking. Of a total of 186,000 motor vehicles needed for a field force of 1,400,000, only a minor portion have so far been delivered.<sup>108</sup> As for airplanes, General Marshall revealed in September that the Army had approximately 1,500 planes that might be used in modern warfare, although only 500 were of the most modern types containing self-sealing fuel tanks and armored fuselages.<sup>109</sup> At that time one prominent observer estimated that the Regular Army divisions were 75 to 90 per cent equipped with modern arms, and the National Guard 50 per cent equipped.<sup>110</sup> As the number of troops in service increases, these figures may temporarily decline.

Serious though they are, these deficiencies may be less significant in the long run than flaws in organization and personnel. The 17 military bureaus of the War Department, not to speak of the five sections of the General Staff, are said to pre-

103. Cf. G. F. Eliot, *Bombs Bursting in Air* (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), p. 166; C. B. Allen in *New York Herald Tribune*, October 6, 1940. Only 64 so-called "flying fortresses" are now in service, with 80 more scheduled for delivery this year. Their flying range varies from 3,000 to 4,000 miles. Cf. Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, October 28, 1940. Forty-six heavy bombers have since been allocated to Britain.

104. Cf. address of General Hugh A. Drum, U.S. Army Information Service (New York) Release, September 29, 1940.

105. War Department data, *Congressional Record*, May 31, 1940, pp. 11064-65.

106. Wheeler-Nicholson, *Battle Shield of the Republic*, cited, chapters VI, X, XII, XIII; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Wanted: A Plan for Defense," *Harpers Magazine*, August 1940.

107. Address of Assistant Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, *New York Herald Tribune*, October 27, 1940.

108. Assistant Secretary of War Patterson, quoted in *The New York Times*, October 15, 1940. Cf. also remarks of William S. Knudsen, *ibid.*, October 9, 1940.

109. *New York Herald Tribune*, September 6, 1940.

110. Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, September 9, 1940.

## STOCKS OF CERTAIN CRITICAL ITEMS ON HAND AND ON ORDER\*

Item	Total on hand or on order, to include fiscal year 1941	Actually on hand May 1, 1940	Actually on hand August 1, 1940	Balance on order August 1, 1940
Anti-aircraft				
3-inch anti-aircraft guns	588	448	471	117
90-mm. anti-aircraft guns	503	0	0	503
Directors	400	168	184	216
Height finders	382	142	153	229
Sound locators	1,179	194	297	882
37-mm. anti-aircraft guns	1,689	15	59	1,630
.50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns	2,568	1,014	1,411	1,157
Small arms				
Semi-automatic rifles	240,559	38,000	49,124	191,435
37-mm. anti-tank guns	1,862	228	228	1,634
60-mm. mortars	3,831	3	3	3,828
81-mm. mortars	905	183	223	682
.50 caliber machine guns (both infantry and pack)	1,874	83	330	1,544
Field artillery matériel				
75-mm. gun, modernized	1,471	141	241	1,230
75-mm. howitzer (field and pack)	392	90	90	302
105-mm. howitzer	240	0	0	240
155-mm. gun, long-range	96	4	4	92
8-inch howitzer	48	0	0	48
Combat vehicles				
Scout cars	2,412	485	525	1,887
Combat cars	148	114	114	34
Tanks, light, M2A4	1,582	10	67	1,515
Tanks, medium, M2	1,308	18	18	1,290
Railway artillery: 8-inch railway gun and carriage	24	0	0	24

\*Source: data furnished by General Marshall, *Congressional Record*, September 5, 1940, p. 17546. This table includes only certain critical items and omits large stocks of old but useful small arms and artillery on hand, as well as about 460 tanks. For fuller discussions of matériel shortage, including ammunition, and many types of equipment, cf. *Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Military Establishment Appropriation Bill*, cited, pp. 421-22; Baldwin, "The New American Army," cited, pp. 43-48.

sent many examples of overlapping functions and lack of coordination.<sup>111</sup> Officers are commissioned not in the line of the Army but in one of the arms or services—for example, the infantry, field artillery or cavalry—and each of these is headed at Washington by a chief representing men who use the same weapons wherever they may be, when representation might more desirably group individuals from the various arms engaged in a specific task, such as coast defense.<sup>112</sup> Despite the existence of a number of joint boards, coordination of Army and Navy activities seems insufficient, especially in such matters as landing exercises and division of functions in over-water aviation.<sup>113</sup>

The abilities of Army officers, moreover, will be subjected to the severest tests in the years ahead.

111. Wheeler-Nicholson, *Battle Shield of the Republic*, cited, pp. 109 ff.; "The High Command," in *A National Defense Program*, seven editorials reprinted from *The New York Times*, May 15-22, 1940; Frank C. Hanighen, "The United States Army," *Harpers Magazine*, December 1940, pp. 1-13.

112. Cf. Major General Johnson Hagood, "Coast Defense: A Plea for Protection of the Atlantic Seaboard," *Army Ordnance*, November-December 1940, pp. 205-07.

113. *Loc. cit.*

There are large numbers of highly qualified officers in the service, but there are also some whose professional ability is open to doubt, or who may not be willing or competent to train their men in accordance with the new developments sanctioned by the War Department. This situation is partly due to the failure, through political interference, of attempts to weed out inefficient leaders, and partly to the absence of any system of selection for promotion by merit below the general officer grades since all commissioned personnel is normally advanced to the rank of colonel on a straight seniority basis.<sup>114</sup> Many Regular Army officers have

114. This system has been modified by a rider attached to the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, giving the President the power to appoint any Regular officer to higher temporary grade in time of national emergency as well as war. *Public Law No. 781*, 76th Congress, p. 4; *Army and Navy Journal*, September 21, 1940, p. 53. Thus, for the present, the iron rule of seniority may be circumvented to allow fuller use of all available talent. Cf. comments of General Marshall, as quoted in *Congressional Record*, September 5, 1940, pp. 17525-27. The method of choosing officers for promotion is always one of the knottiest problems of both the Navy, which utilizes a selection system, and the Army, which has not done so except for aspirants for general officer rankings.

had too little experience in handling large bodies of troops, and the number of Reserve and Guard officers—generally much less well-trained—will be about five times the number of Regulars in 1941.

Enlisted men, too, suffer from lack of training and appreciation of the nature of modern war, as well as a varying degree of physical softness. Maneuvers held by the four field armies in the summer of 1940 revealed the existence of these deficiencies and convinced officers that it might take six months to make qualified combat troops of some Regular Army divisions, and one year for the National Guard.<sup>115</sup> The flood of recruits obtained by voluntary enlistment and conscription will necessarily prolong this process. Trained men have been formed into cadres which have been filled by assignment of raw troops for instruction. Instead of diluting almost all Regular units in this manner, the War Department might have done better to put two or more divisions of seasoned soldiers in full readiness at once for any contingency during the critical period immediately ahead. As it is, one commentator believes it "obvious that for the next eighteen months we shall not have an army so much as an aggregation of half-trained units—both in the air and on the ground."<sup>116</sup>

Thus the Army has chosen to plan not for the immediate future but for more distant eventualities. It seems a reasonable deduction that the General Staff is not greatly alarmed by the prospects of an invasion of the Western Hemisphere in 1941. Many unofficial observers would concur in this judgment. Given the difficulties of transporting and supplying an Old World force in the New, they would say that the United States' military needs for hemisphere defense could be met by a Regular Army of 400,000 to 600,000 completely equipped mobile troops ready for quick transportation to any threatened point in the Americas.<sup>117</sup>

Preparations for training three to four million men may, however, be justified by other considerations beside the possible value of compulsory military service as an instrument of national education in a period of crisis. A mass army may conceivably be necessary whether the United States stands its ground in the Western Hemisphere against a hostile world outside, or whether it chooses to aid Great Britain by force of arms. In defending the Hemisphere large forces may have to be used under two conditions. In the first place,

there is a possibility of a concerted German-Italian-Japanese attack after Axis triumphs in Europe and Asia and many months of feverish preparation unhampered by resistance from the conquered nations. Second, great numbers of troops would be required for occupation of large areas of Latin American territory. The prospect of the first eventuality is remote but undeniable; and there seems to be very little likelihood of the second. In either case, this country should have sufficient time for the training and equipment of hundreds of thousands of newly inducted men.

It is less certain that the option of extending military aid to Britain will remain open indefinitely. If British resistance continues, the actions of its enemies or the measure of Britain's need may call for the dispatch of small, mobile units to occupy outlying points like Dakar or even Singapore, before existing American units are fully trained. Ultimately, assuming that Britain and the Axis are locked in a stalemate conflict for years to come, large American forces might participate in a British offensive on the European continent.

At present it is politically inexpedient for either military or political leaders to refer to this possibility in public statements. Nor has a final choice been made between isolated Hemisphere defense and unrestricted assistance to the British. Yet, unless the General Staff has abandoned the classical foundation of American strategy, it must be planning for offensive operations in case of war. The general principles of aggressive defense, even outside the limits of the Americas, could perhaps be formulated most clearly in their relation to our foreign policy by a National Defense Commission composed of both civilians and representatives of the armed services. Still more important, such a commission might serve to coordinate the many aspects of defense policy now handled by a number of executive agencies and congressional committees with no effective integration except through the President.<sup>118</sup> In a period of national emergency, clarity and decision in military policy are necessary to assure national survival.

117. Cf. George Fielding Eliot, in *Senate Hearings on Compulsory Military Training and Service*, cited, pp. 247-49; *idem*, *The Ramparts We Watch*, cited, Chapter XIII; Baldwin, "Wanted: A Plan for Defense," cited. On the difficulties of invasion, even if the United States Navy were defeated, cf. *loc. cit.*; Mauritz Hallgren, *The Tragic Fallacy* (New York, Knopf, 1937). To provide 600,000 mobile troops in the United States, a total force of over one million men would be needed.

118. The need for such a body is widely recognized. Cf. Lindsay Rogers, "National Defense: Plan or Patchwork?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1940, pp. 1-11.

115. Hanson W. Baldwin, *The New York Times*, September 9, 10, 1940.

116. Baldwin, "The New American Army," cited, p. 53.

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*By Vera Micheles Dean*